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This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's

proceeding. It

a

involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as

in Idaho

Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program, required by federal law and

by state statute

and rules, that seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients to reimburse
federal treasuries for medical payments made on their behalf during their lives.

state and
matter involves a

claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the "Department")

the

estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her spouse.
Course of Proceedings
Department was

The personal representative was appointed on May 22,2009. R. p. 2.

first notified of this matter upon receipt of the personal representative's Petition for Approval of
Settlement filed November 16,2009. 1 R. p. 8. The Department immediately filed a Claim Against
Estate (R. p. 13), a Demand for Notice (R. p. 16), and an Objection to Final Settlement (R. p. 18).
The personal representative then filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim. R. p.

The Department

a Petition for Allowance of Claim, as required to preserve its rights by Idaho Code § lS-3-806(a).
hearing held on February 3,2010, on the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, mid
Claim

on March 30,2010, Judge Frates issued his Memorandum Decision Denying
Against

The Department filed a Notice of Appeal

lIdaho Code
or her appointment within 30

s

a
not occur in this case.

-1

an April 7, 2010.

the

the

of his
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re:

on

and

fees and

attorney
10, the court "'TI1"pr<'"

Code § 12-117. On

to

Order on Attorney Fees, denying

attorney fees requested pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. Oral argument on appeal to the District
Court was held on February 8,2011, and the District Court's Memorandum Decision on Appeal was
filed July 20,2011.
Statement of the Facts
Vivian and Emerson Wiggins were

u,-<,-,vu,uu

and

2002, when Vivian was 90 years old,

she needed nursing care and entered the nursing horne. R. p. 36. Emerson applied for Medicaid
benefits to assist in paying Vivian's nursing home costs, and Medicaid was approved effective
September 1,2003. R. p. 36. There is some question as to

this was accomplished. After the

death of both Vivian and Emerson in 2009, Emerson was in possession of$78,508.59 in cash assets.
R. p. 22. The personal representative asserted these funds were the residue of the couple's community
property which had been transmuted into Emerson's separate property through a marriage settlement
agreement when Vivian's Medicaid eligibility was being
have no more than $3,000 in countable resources (such as
16.03.05.201. While no marriage settlement
was eligible

Medicaid

gn~enleIl[

in 2002. A married person can
to qualify for HH''"'''''~U.'''''. IDAPA

was ever found, by determining that Vivian

2003,

as if she

ans:lerreo almost all of

countable resources to
must

existed

s

it

-2

assets to rn"''''''r,,,, sometime in
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L'-'UJlVvL

1,

the

14.

l34.68 on behalf of
age

at
7.

R. p. 37.

---'--J 30,

died less than two weeks later on

9,2009. R.

was 98 years old.
probate

and Emerson was opened on May 22, 2008. R. p. 2. Joint probate is
community has been dissolved by the death of either spouse at any time,

permitted

entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse

died

death occurred first .... " Idaho Code § 15-3-111. Therefore, because Vivian died first, all of
Vivian's assets passed to Emerson either by operation of law or through the presumed marriage
settlement agreement.
The inventory showed assets of$78,508.59 in "C.D.'s, Notes and Cash."

s
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§

1.
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets

had been

'-'VJcLliJ,.lUJ.H

had become the separate property of Emerson
2.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Ida..ho

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had

§ 56-218(1)community

had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal

Z:\!'vl.<.rzCases\Estate\WCC\\VCC Open Cases\\VigginsV\Supreme Court\",<\-:ppeUants Bnef v.rpd

or

I.
JU."""1J."-'-'

As . . .

L\.'J.ULLH..,U

OF REVIEW

Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 563, 249 P.3d 362

(2011):
an appeal from the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, this Court:
reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure.
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981), quoted in Doe
v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 759-60, 53 P.3d 341, 342-43 (2002).
Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho at

249 P.3d at 364-5. Moreover, as

stated in Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006):
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity
over the magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court's decision
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate
decision. This Court will uphold the magistrate court's findings of fact if they are
supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record.
Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho at 378,146 P.3d at 645.
freely reviews the

there are no genuine issues of fact, the Court
Welfare, 150 Idaho

742, 746
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BELOW
court disallowed the Department's claim against the joint estate. Judge
could not recover from Emerson Wiggins's separate property, even
nrr\np1'1>;r

had once been the couple's community property. This conclusion seems to

of Judge Frates's view that the Idaho legislature intended to allow couples to avoid
to Medicaid by executing a marriage settlement agreement:
Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognized under Idaho law and require
specific statutory compliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature contemplated that
transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid and/or their spouses without
compensation in order to avoid repayment.
Me~mc~rarldum

Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6 (emphasis added) (R. p.

12
While the briefing and argument before Judge Frates had included discussion of federal
preemption and the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008) cert. denied sub nom Vas
129 S.Ct. 2859, 174 L.Ed.2d 576 (2009), Judge Frates's decision does not mention or

"v.

discuss

However,

1"Wp'prrl1"Wl

recover against property

Conclusion of his decision, Judge Frates stated, "The Department
the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her
Petitioner's

laH~U<:l.."''"'

seems to be

Lf"o~.'HU'

the Estate, p. 7 (R. p.
it is

a

-6
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Trout believed

Department

c~HUU1U

required to

settlement agreements in order to recover property which had

S

v V '..U.H.LCUAHY

property

but was transmuted before death. In her view, Emerson's separate property assets were available for
recovery, but only if the Department first voided the marriage sernelne:m aJcre:enlerlL In her discussion
of the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h), Judge Trout stated:
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what should be
included in the recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient
recipient's
would have had in his or her estate but for the actions of the recipient or
spouse. While this would appear to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA
as the Department argues, there is nothing in the statute that makes this happen
automatically. In other words, simply because the definition of "assets" could include
that property doesn't mean that such transactions are set aside "Jjthout further action.
There should be some action taken to recover those resources into the recipient's
Decision.
estate. such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in

***
... Some action should be required in order for those resources to be included and
I.C. § 56-218(2) is the vehicle for doing so.
Memorandum Decision on Appeal, pp. 11, 13 (R. pp. 437,439). Judge Trout understood that such a
set-aside action would have been impossible in this case because of the statute oflimitations.
Memorandum Decision on Appeal, p. 13 (R. p. 439). However, she felt that

was a defect

statute that could be corrected by the Legislature. Id

Z:\h1RCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme CourtV'.ppellams Briefwpd

§
PERMITS RECOVERY
OF EITHER SPOUSE OR BOTH, WITHOUT
REGARD TO
THE ASSETS WOULD BE
CHARACTERIZED AS COMMlJNITY OR SEPARATE.
Idaho Code § 56-218

aut.hOl·lZc~S

recovery from the estate of both the Medicaid recipient and

her spouse:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance vvith federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five
(55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, ~~~~~
paid to either or both;
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline

_~~. __ ,

Nothing in the statute limits this recovery to property

characterized as community or separate property. It is clear and unambiguous. Likewise, Department
rules make confirm that separating a

assets through a marriage settlement agreement will not

vitiate the Department's estate recovery claim against the estate of the spouse:

05. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets for a
married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other
such agreement may be voided not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07)
IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 (underline

2

as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 61

Department's rules have the same force and effect
84 P.3d 551,555 (2004).

the
below this rule was cited as ID.A.P A 16.03.09.900.24.
Trout believed that this
and the other rule cited here, ID"A.PA 16.03.09.905.01, cited below as Rule
were deleted in 2010.
Memorc.ndum Decision on Appeal, p. 9 (R. p.
is incorrect. These rules were simply renumbered.

s

-8
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assets

had previously held

ati

Limitations on Estate Claims. * * *A claim against the estate of a
spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at
any time after October 1, 1993, community property, or the deceased participant's
share of the separate property, and jointly owned property. * * *.
01.

16.03.09.905.01. This rule limits the Department's claim against the estate of the spouse to
assets which had been community property, jointly owned assets, or property of the Medicaid recipient
the effective date of OBRA '93,3 as required by this Court's decision in Idaho Department of

and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 216, 970 P.2d 6,9 (1998). This is the date the
states were authorized to adopt the expanded definition of "estate" found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4).
The rule does not expand, but rather limits, the application of Idaho Code § 56-218 to avoid federal
preemption that could otherwise result, as discussed in Jackman.
Idaho law permits recovery from the estate of either spouse, so long as the assets are traceable
to the couple's community or jointly owned property, or the assets had been the property of the
Medicaid recipient. Nothing in the law or rules otherwise limits recovery based on the final
assets as separate or commupity. As discussed, below, it is this tracing of assets
may have

transferred to the spouse, that the Medicaid recovery law specifically intends.

Reconciliation Act of I

-9

L. 103-66.
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A
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW, CHANGES
AWAY AND ESTATE RECOVERY
Both the Magistrate and the District Court

PASS

that assets =~~ for purposes

"',,-,,-,LU,",U

of determining Medicaid eligibility would suddenly be ===-=

of Medicaid estate

recovery. Indeed, Judge Frates thought that a marriage settlement greement would only serve its
purpose if it allowed the couple to avoid estate recovery. See
Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6

CR. p. 121).

",""""H'cn"""H,L',LLH

Likewise,

Decision Denying
felt that the Department

should be required to bring a separate action to set-aside the marriage settlement agreement before
recovery could be made. See Memorandum Decision on Appeal, pp. 1 ,13
However, excluding certain property for eligibility, but including

pp. 437,439).

same property for estate recovery

is exactly what the law intends.
As discussed by the Court in Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health

145 Idaho 530,

181 P .3d 456 (2008), Medicaid eligibility for elderly couples involves complex rules allowing certain
Some

assets to be shifted from the spouse needing Medicaid eligibility to the
assets, such as the couple's home, are "excluded" and not counted
permitted by the rules, assets are shifted to the non-Medicaid spouse,

When, as
not

counted, in determining the Medicaid spouse's eligibility.
H""."-LV"'-LU

recipient
ret~erencc;;d

her spouse

passed

above,

assets
are

IS
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estate

treatment

asset

OBRA '93 was
§1

"expanded

Also included were new definitions, including

clearly includes the property of the Medicaid recipient's spouse.

a sweeping
definition is now

at

U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1):

term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
and of the individual's spouse, including any income or
or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not

resources of

receive because of
by
or such individual's spouse,
(B)
by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, or
(C)
by
person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
of the individual or such individual's spouse.
direction or upon
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)4

~U_'~U.LUV

added). This definition greatly increases the scope of estate

recovery to include assets that had been shifted to the non-Medicaid spouse for purposes of Medicaid
eligibility.
Further revealing

VHL,u.li",'-'

in the treatment of a couple's assets after their death is the
.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). "Resources," for purposes of eligibility, is

definition of
defmed in 20

some qualifications, "cash or other liquid assets or any

real or personal

n"'E,,...~'rh

any) owns and could convert to cash to be
§ 1382b, provides certain exclusions to the

of

IS

definitions were

found at subsectlon

for

of 42 U.S,c. §

Z:\1vfRCases\Estare\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme COUJ'L\..Ap?ellants Briei,'W'Pd

from resources
determining the resources an
shall be excluded horne (including
land that appertains

.u,-",,",.v

.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1). This is why, when determining Medicaid eligibility,

s

IS

excluded. However, the definition of "resources" for purposes of estate recovery, found in 42 U
§ 1396p(h)(5), specifically includes the family home:
(5)
The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b
of this title, without reQ:ard ... to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such

U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5) (underline added). These provisions in section 1396p show
~~!.£

that assets excluded for eligibility be included for estate recovery. Recovery is made

death of both the Medicaid recipient and the spouse, when the reason for shifting the assets in
has ceased to exist. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2).
If these provisions in section 1396p are not clear enough by themselves, the intent of these
changes enacted in OBRA '93 were clearly explained by the House Budget Committee as follows:
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate recovery
program that meets certain requirements. The program must identify and track
resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) of individuals who
receive nursing facility, home and community-based services, and other specified
long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain when the individual and
the surviving spouse, if anv, dies, and must provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from
the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as
all
and personal property of a deceased individual and all other assets which
had fu'1y legally cognizable title or interest at the time
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy,

1

51 2.
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out

at
,",U.,:>ULH'-''-Ll

provisions of

1

Perhaps not coincidentally, Idaho's estate recovery statute was passed
recovery statute provided for recovery

the estate of

same year. This new estate

spouse:

56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance.
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf an individual
received such
who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when
assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the estate of the
surviving spouse, if anv, shall be charged for such aid paid to either or both ....

Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988) (underline added).

described

Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 181 P.3d 456 (2008),

spouse by assuring that he was able to have sufficient
needs. However, the legislature seemed to recognize that
would have assets that had been shifted to him during the
remaining after both spouses had died should be recovered.

"~n-r-T/H'r1

v. Idaho Dept. of

protected the non-Medicaid
resources to provide for his own
mefult that the non-Medicaid spouse
process, and that any of those assets
it provided for recovery from

the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse.
The MCCA was intended to provide a benefit to
there is nothing in the law, the rules, or the legislative
dependent heirs were intended beneficiaries of this assistance.
VLU'<H'.F,

to transfers of assets to trusts

Medicaid

'-'-'-"cUvU-LU

recipient and her spouse,
that

couple's non-

discussing the Department's rules
recognized the clear ratlon.ale

The rationale of the rule is
from the home property
home assistance.

- 13
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at

8,181 P.3dat

estate

The

are

needs have
.,.LU',."

VLL< ...

assets, no matter

estate they may be found in.

v.
CLAIM FOR MEDICAID RECOVERY IS STATUTORY
AND NOT BASED ON A CONTRACT WITH THE COUPLE.
Underlying the decisions
HL'~UL"'U.'U.

separate property

the courts below is the assumption that there was a contract for

benefits binding Vivian Wiggins, but not Emerson, and therefore, Emerson's

JU\JU.LU

not be chargeable for Vivian's debt. Indeed, this assumption is demonstrated

s comment regarding Idaho Code § 32-912:

District

There is
in the record to indicate that Emerson signed in writing agreeing to bind
separate property for the debts of Vivian. Vvlrile that may very well have been part
of the Medicaid application process, it is not in the record.
Memorandum

on Appeal, p. 7 (R. p. 433). This underlying assumption, however, is

incorrect. Applying

Medicaid is not a commercial transaction. There is no bargained for exchange

or quid pro quo.

there are notices given to the couple, relating to estate recovery and other
receIvmg

...'-''-''''''...,,\..!.,

there is no contract or agreement for repayment.

is entirely based on meeting the requirements of the relevant statutes

IS

§

on the statute, not on any contract or agreement.

) states:

s

- 4
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or

exempted or
on
chapter
when the individual

Code § 56-218(1). The sale precondition for

is

recipient reaches fifty-five years of age.

An application for Medicaid may be made by someone who is an "authorized rpr.rP'"pnT'AT1
or "someone acting responsibly for the applicant," rather than someone

contract on behalf of the applicant. 42 C.F.R. § 435.907. For some who already receive
benefits, no separate application for Medicaid is required. 42 C.F.R. § 435

a

could legally enter

federal

These

are

clearly not designed to require applicants to contractually bind themselves to repay a debt.
there is no enforceable "debt" until both spouses have passed away. Ida..'1o Code § 56-21
There are potential remedies if a Medicaid recipient or her spouse transfers assets without adequate
consideration. See e.g. Idaho Code § 56-218(2) (such transfers may be voidable) and 42

.S.C. §

1396p(c) (eligibility penalties). However, there are no circumstances that repayment of correctly paid
Medicaid can be demanded from a living spouse. There is no debt to the living Medicaid recipient or
her non-Medicaid spouse. Rather, there is a statutory right to recover from

estate alone. The

is not a claim based on a contract, but solely on statute.
As described in Stafford, both spouses are intimately involved

process.

145 Idaho at 534-6, 181 P.3d at 460-2 (discussing of the
This process benefits both the

HL'AU"'U.'",",

the nOII-lV1CUlcaiO
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sufficient
spouse while also
that a fair share of
the care of the institutionalized spouse.

income and resources
the couple's resources were
Stafford, 145 Idaho at 534,181 P.3d at 460

/¥1!nTTrtrT

Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 870, 120 S.Ct.
the Medicaid application process could be

145 L.Ed.2d 144 (l
VleCL,wvU

both spouses participated and both spouses

Therefore, even if

to a contract, it would be a contract in which

V~LLVH'~~'~'

Medicaid spouse would still be subject to

167 F.3d 801,805 (3rd

Cleary v.

YL'-",.uvc",,-<

the separate property of the nonrecovery "debt." Williams v. Paxton, 98

Idaho 155, 162,559 P.2d 1123, 1130 (1
The reality is, estate recovery is an

remedy which is enforceable, not against
estates after they pass away. Other than the tracing of

the couple individually, but only against
joint assets, as previously discussed,

IS

no

v,-""",-.:>tv.u

to determine whether the estate consists of

community or separate property,
It is for this same reason that it is urmecessary for the Department to seek to set-aside marriage

settlement agreements, Those agreements serve a

under

Spousal Impoverisllment

provisions to preserve assets for the non-Medicaid spouse. However, because recovery does not
depend on the ultimate Cll,rra<;tel'lZcltlon

couple's .,.,,..ryn,,,1"T<.T, it is not necessary to set aside the

marriage settlement

- 16
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Code § 56-218 permits

recovery of the assets of this

can

estate

characterized as community or separate property. The Department's claim should be allowed.
DATED

day of May, 2012,

--

~1o~i~p~···:....!'¥-4
Deput{::\.ttomey General
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